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CoiDinunity Policing in Seattle: 
A Model Partnership Between 
Citizens and Police 
When citizens and police in South Seattle 
banded together to fight crime, quarterly 
crime statistics showed dramatic improve-
ments in the quality of life. Citizen activity 
spread in the city's other three police pre-
cincts; now community policing is a going 
concern throughout Seattle-a citywide 
success. 
The story of this success shows what can 
happen when citizens work in partnership 
with the police to prevent crime and create 
safer neighborhoods. 
Community policing 
The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) has 
been a leader since the mid-seventies in the 
development and implementation of what 
is now called community policing. 
From the Director 
The outlines of a new direction for police, 
known as "community policing," emerged 
in the 1980's in response to a rising tide of 
crime in the 1960's and 1970's. The ap-
proach affirms the importance of police 
and citizens working together to control 
crime and maintain order. 
NIJ has been conducting research in com-
munity policing for more than a decade and 
a half. Early field experiments tested 
various police-citizen partnerships and 
ways in which foot patrol, door-to-door 
contact, and other positive contact between 
police and citizens could reduce the fear of 
crime and improve neighborhood life. 
Later, the Institute explored various facets 
of the problem-oriented approach to con-
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NIJ's early research on comprehensive 
crime prevention programs focused on 
policing, community involvement, and 
environmental security strategies as 
exemplified in Hartford's Crime Control 
Program. 
"Fear of crime" studies in Houston and 
Newark confirmed that community condi-
tions, the "Broken Windows" of which 
James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling 
wrote, 1 help to define crime's interaction 
with community life. Also, "problem-
oriented policing" studies in Norfolk dem-
onstrated how police, as individuals and as 
an institution, can assume an innovative 
and participatory role in community life. 
As part of its efforts to increase informa-
tion about community policing, NIJ 
granted funding in 1988 for the Seattle 
trolling crime, particularly drug trafficking. 
This approach calls on police to exercise both 
initiative in identifying the source of problems 
and imaginativeness in enlisting community 
help in developing solutions. 
NIJ is currently engaged in a comprehensive 
program of research, technical assistance, and 
training to encourage innovations in commu-
nity policing and police-citizen partnerships to 
combat crime and drugs. The Institute is also 
evaluating neighborhood policing projects 
funded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance. 
We believe in community policing's potential 
for better, smarter law enforcement. This 
Research in Brief on South Seattle' s police-
citizen partnership is the first in a series of new 
NIJ publications on community policing in 
TY POLIC 
Police Department to conduct a descriptive 
research project on the South Seattle crime 
prevention efforts that led to community 
policing in the city. 
A city's postwar changes 
South of downtown Seattle and the city's 
racially mixed Central Area lies Rainier 
Valley (see figure 1). Businesses along its 
main thoroughfares, Rainier A venue and 
Martin Luther King Way, focus on lower 
middle-class and working-class needs. (To 
the west is a heavily industrial area and, 
further still, West Seattle-geographically 
separated from the rest of the city and 
reached by bridges and causeways.) 
Rainier Valley once resembled the rest of 
Seattle: prosperous, progressive, demo-
graphically two-thirds white with fair-sized 
urban areas. Other publications are planned 
on projects in Madison, Wisconsin, and 
Houston, Texas. 
We also know that citizens have a stake in 
their neighborhoods and, when given a 
chance, will work hard with police to take 
back their streets from drug traffickers and 
other criminal elements. In South Seattle 
that is exactly what citizens and police did, 
working together. By putting their story on 
these pages, NIJ encourages citizens and 
public servants in other communities to 
take heart and do likewise. 
Charles B. DeWitt 
Director 
National Institute of Justice 
Figure 1 
City of Seattle 
Seattle is located on a peninsula in Puget Sound. The shaded area is the Southeast, loosely 
referred to as Rainier Valley, where formation and activities of the South Seattle Crime 
Prevention Council began in 1987. 
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African-American and Asian minorities 
and smaller groups of Hispanics and Na-
tive Americans. After World War II, two 
large new public housing projects and an 
influx of African Americans from the 
Central Area increased the proportion of 
low-income minorities.2 
However, the Southeast failed to keep pace 
economically. New construction declined. 
The crime rate rose. 
Confident of their long-standing political 
clout, community activists met in the 
1970's with city and county officials, 
including the county prosecutor, to express 
their concern over what they perceived to 
be a crime wave. Their Court Watch pro-
gram helped defeat two judges perceived 
as lax on offenders. Furthermore, a pre-
cinct police commander promoted team 
policing and community involvement, a 
proposal that won much citizen support. 
In 1979, the mayor established the Eco-
nomic Renewal Task Force of Rainier 
Valley. This was preceded by a Block 
Watch program to cut the rate of residen-
tial burglary; the Nation's first Business 
Watch program to tackle commercial 
burglaries; and the Crime Prevention 
League to serve as the southeast Seattle 
business community's private crime fight-
ing agency. 
Narcotics and street crime 
Then crack cocaine came to Rainier 
Valley. 
Paralleling developments in the rest of the 
city, State, and Nation, cocaine use spread 
in minority areas, especially the housing 
developments. The city's narcotics viola-
tions rose from 582 in 1983 to 4,850 in 
1989. Police discovered fortified homes 
dealing cocaine, and street gangs infested 
parks, parking lots, and other public areas. 
Calls for service started to climb in 1984 
(see figure 2). 
Community organizations and police tried 
tough new tactics. A black activist whose 
father was a police officer became security 
officer for the housing projects and gave 
police information they needed to get 
search warrants. The Rainier Chamber of 
Commerce also launched a cleanup and 
antigraffiti drive. 
For its part, the Seattle Police Department 
set up a precinct Anticrime Team (ACT) 
Figure2 
Calls for Service 
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Call!i for service1 rose sharply throughout Sea LUe from I 984 onwards. While they declined sllghtly beginning in 1988 for other parts of the 
city, in the south they continued to rise. This trend may reflect a rise in public a war ness of police services following the formation of 
SSCPC. See tigure 3 for a p icture of crime trends during the same period.) 
1This includes all on-views/calls for service. 
2 Citywide total CFS 1989 = 429,960. 
comprising a sergeant, a detective, and two 
uniformed officers-not to make arrests 
but to disrupt or destroy drug operations. 
Although the team's efforts drew wide 
community support, a department review 
of its tactics led to a restructuring of the 
ACT operation. 
The department directed the new Anticrime 
Team to adhere strictly to established 
departmental procedures, with more em-
phasis placed on making arrests. Yet even 
though the new ACT squad made 422 
arrests in 2 months, the increasingly in-
volved community voiced continued sup-
port for the original ACT procedures. 
Furthermore, the commercial burglary rate 
continued to rise. 
Raising a new 
community voice 
At an informal gathering at the Rainier 
Chamber of Commerce in the spring of 
1987, some citizens questioned the motiva-
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tion of patrol officers in the South Precinct. 
While the immediate concern was the 
rising commercial burglary rate, an ulti-
mate concern was the economic and social 
future of the Southeast. Many of those at 
the meeting had businesses there; most still 
lived there. 
The editor and publisher of the South Dis-
trict Journal had called the meeting. He 
had close ties with Chamber of Commerce 
members and with police officials both in 
the South Precinct and throughout the city. 
The police precinct commander, who 
frequently attended subsequent meetings, 
convinced the businessmen and women 
that the commercial burglaries were tied to 
the prevalence of crack houses and drug 
use. The business leaders then met with the 
mayor to propose a program that included: 
• A community review committee to set 
priorities for reducing crime. 
• Greater productivity and better commu-
nication within the police department and 
other city departments. 
• A proactive, not reactive, police 
response to citizen concerns. 
• Standards of achievement for police 
from the chief on down. 
• Reporting procedures to assure citizens 
the police were making progress. 
The mayor expressed faith in the police 
chief who, in tum, encouraged police su-
pervisors to meet frequently with the citi-
zen group. At those meetings, the police 
stressed the legal, administrative, and bud-
getary restraints they faced. Although dis-
couraged by this, the community group 
considered its previous years of coopera-
tion with the police and decided the com-
munity itself would have to supply the 
"vision and imagination" to solve its 
problems. 
The police, for their part, discovered they 
faced not a group of mere complainers, 
looking for quick fixes, but people seeking 
broad-based, long-term solutions to the 
problem of crime. Rather than using infor-
mation supplied by the police to attack the 
police, the citizen group lobbied before the 
city council and legislature for more police 
funds and powers. 
In September 1987, the Rainier Chamber 
of Commerce submitted a plan to the 
mayor that proposed: 
• Increasing South Precinct staff by 15 
sworn officers and several civilians. 
• Creating a Community Advisory Com-
mittee "to develop the program" and its 
guidelines. 
• Obtaining "total support" from the chief 
of police, the mayor, and the advisory 
committee for the precinct commander, 
who would head the program. 
• Giving special training for precinct per-
sonnel "to provide liaison between the 
community, the [advisory] committee, and 
the South Precinct." 
• Providing special community support 
"if the [Police] Department has insufficient 
funds." 
Although police department negotiators 
were unable to promise additional re-
sources for the South Precinct without 
disrupting citywide patterns, they did point 
out ways of stretching available precinct 
resources. 
Community negotiators felt the word "ad-
visory" meant "partnership," that the com-
munity truly would exercise a strong voice 
in selecting police targets and goals. Police 
felt they had the legal power to run their 
own operations. Still, they were aware that 
the Chamber had the power to take its case 
to the press. 
Neither side overplayed its hand. The 
advisory committee's powers remained 
ambiguous, but a pattern of cooperation 
developed. In testimony before the city 
council, the police chief praised the 
community's intervention into their social 
problems. 
Crime prevention 
group reborn 
In January of 1988, the Chamber resur-
rected the corporate shell of the defunct 
Crime Prevention League (a private crime 
fighting agency formed in 1984 that had 
since faded because of a lack of funds) and 
changed its name to the South Seattle 
Crime Prevention Council (SSCPC). 
This became a self-perpetuating assem-
blage of community organizations, not an 
open membership association. The lightly 
publicized regular meetings were attended 
only by approximately 17 members 
(whose attendance record ran about 80 
percent) and a few invited guests. Either 
the precinct captain or one of his lieuten-
ants attended as a full participating 
member. 
The police "members," high ranking as 
they usually were, talked as frankly as the 
civilians. They freely discussed police 
plans and tactics that, in a group consid-
ered less "a part of the team," would have 
been considered strictly confidential. 
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Choosing police targets 
SSCPC discussed targeting of crime prob-
lems at an early meeting, 2 weeks before 
its activity became official, but adjourned 
for lack of a quorum. The clear implication 
was that when a quorum was present, this 
community organization, despite having no 
formal government status, could decide 
where police would concentrate their 
efforts. 
A truly radical departure in American 
policing was now under way. At subse-
quent weekly meetings, with police com-
mand staff present, targets were selected, 
added, or classified as "pending" or "re-
solved"-all by formal parliamentary 
motion. 
The chosen targets were, for the most part, 
those the police determined were the prin-
cipal hot spots in the Southeast. The com-
munity agreed. The issue of "power" or 
"control" as opposed to "advice" did not 
yet arise because there was no controversy 
over the action itself. 
With the dominant initiative in selection 
coming from the police, police targets 
could be specific locations and offenses or 
more general problems, such as abandoned 
cars. The precinct captain's biggest con-
cern over abandoned cars was their use for 
drug dealing. The citizens were more con-
cerned with appearances in the neighbor-
hood. Yet even before the citizen concern 
had been made known, SSCPC went along 
with the captain's suggestion. 
Dealing with targets 
Police action consisted of aggressive 
patrol with special attention to the targets. 
Officers were expected to visit these at 
least twice each shift, fully documenting 
the visits in special log entries. 
In addition, police reviewed crack house 
reports from the community hotline. Con-
finned reports were added to the target list. 
By the end of the first year, police were 
working on 39 targets, successfully "com-
pleting" nearly half. By the end of the 
following year, the other half had been 
taken care of. Twenty crack houses were 
included in the initial 39 targets, and most 
were closed within the first year. Yet po-
lice and community had to persist in ef-
forts to drive crack houses permanently out 
Jf an area since these tended to move from 
place to place. 
At SSCPC meetings, police reported in 
detail on criminal or disorderly behavior at 
the targets. Citizen representatives re-
ported, too-on how citizens, no longer 
afraid of being accosted by drug dealers at 
bus stops, began to use public transporta-
tion again and how graffiti or prostitution 
declined in a given area. 
The targeting procedure reaped other ben-
efits as well. It gave the police a chance to 
interact with the community around spe-
cific public safety issues. This went be-
yond "public relations." Citizen.s learned 
how the criminal justice response to crime 
works (or doesn't work). For example, 
when arrested drug dealers showed up on 
the streets again, people realized that ar-
rests alone did not assure public safety; the 
rest of the criminal justice system had to 
follow through. 
Targeting also broadened the police's 
outlook. When the community put pressure 
on landlords who were not cooperating in 
the civil abatement process to evict tenants 
who deal in drugs, the connection between 
a community's pressure and a suddenly 
cooperative landlord was soon clear to the 
police. 
Thus encouraged by the community's help, 
the police viewed their work differently 
from before. The target selection process 
directed their attention away from mere 
response to individual calls toward broader 
responsibility for dealing with community 
issues. 
Despite a few administrative problems, 
including some dissatisfaction with a lack 
of patrol officer input into the target selec-
tion, the procedure was successful in either 
displacing or ending illegal activity at the 
targets. 
Programs aid crime control 
Concerns were wide ranging and led to the 
development of several key programs and 
strategies. These included the following: 
Narcotics activity reports (NAR's). 
Citizen complaints of drug activity were 
received by phone or in person, at the 
station, on the beat, or through the commu-
nity hotline. Each NAR was forwarded to 
Police had an active presence in many neighborhoods, including several housing projects where 
resident managers were concerned about drug-related crime. Officer Marsha Wilson talks with the 
manager of Martin Luther King Apartments. 
the Narcotics Division, which assigned it 
for followup investigation by patrol, the 
Anticrime Team (ACT), the narcotics 
street team, or narcotics detectives. Usually 
a precinct officer in the area of narcotics 
activity did a followup investigation to 
substantiate the activity. If further action 
was required, the officer notified ACT, the 
narcotics street team, or other detectives. If 
the activity was not substantiated, an offi-
cer or sergeant contacted the complainant 
to report this fact. Police followed up I ,219 
such reports in one year. 
Criminal trespass program. Property 
owners gave police advance permission to 
enter private property such as parking lots 
or exterior stairs to investigate and poten-
tially arrest loiterers. Police could cite or 
arrest individuals who might have been 
loitering to do drug transactions, even 
though the transactions were not taking 
place at the time. The trespass program 
required a first warning (either in person or 
5 
through posted signs) that trespassing was 
illegal and that violators would be cited. 
More than 100 businesses signed up, and 
1,044 persons received citations. 
Pay telephone program. Standard pay 
phones were put on a "call out only" sta-
tus. Once the phones could not receive 
incoming calls, drug dealers could no 
longer use them to receive messages. Dur-
ing 1988, 13 phones were put on "call out 
only" status. 
Owner notification (drug trafficking 
civil abatement program). This program 
gave property owners quick notice that 
their tenants faced legal action for using 
their property for drug-involved purposes. 
Originally started by the police department 
as a mere warning that illegal activity was 
being carried out on an owner's premises, 
the program became part of the city's 
implementation of the State's 1988 
Abatement Law. 
Two warnings are given to the owner of a 
property where narcotics activity has been 
observed and documented through search 
warrants. If the problem is not corrected 
after the second search warrant, a final 
abatement notice is mailed and abatement 
proceedings are initiated. The large major-
ity of owners (90 percent) have been re-
sponsive, and only a small number of 
premises actually go through the entire 
abatement process. 
A landlord education component was 
incorporated into the abatement program. 
SSCPC sponsors a series of training ses-
sions for apartment owners and managers 
on how to keep their property drug free. 
SSCPC's strong link to the real estate 
community, heretofore seeh as an obstacle 
to building a broader base in the commu-
nity, turned out to be an asset in this .case. 
SSCPC could reach into the network of 
apartment owners and operators to encour-
age them to attend the workshops. SSCPC 
representatives and the South Precinct 
captain showed the landlords how they 
could legally screen renters for previous 
drug involvement, require that tenants keep 
the apartment drug free, and obtain police 
assistance during evictions. 
Antigraffiti program. "Paintouts" were a 
popular activity for anticrime volunteers. 
Launched by the Rainier Chamber of 
Commerce, the program gained the sup-
port of both the police and SSCPC, which 
promotes the progrrup in its information 
packet. Some police officers have partici-
pated in the paintouts in addition to look-
ing for and citing people making graffiti. 
In 1989, Seattle's engineering department 
received funding for an antigraffiti coordi-
nator as well as paint for the program. In 
addition, the city 's Summer Youth Em-
ployment program (a supervisor and seven 
staff) joined the effort, and a graffiti hot-
line was established, with calls relayed to 
the engineering department coordinator for 
followup. 
Telephone hotline. This is basically an 
anonymous tipline. However, callers were 
urged to use it for any public service prob-
lems that were not "911 emergencies." If 
they wanted to sacrifice anonymity in 
order to learn the results of a call, they 
could leave a phone number or address. 
Much to the surprise of SSCPC and some 
of the police, 40 percent of the calls con-
cemed abandoned cars. Police arranged for 
the removal of so many cars that the tow-
ing company temporarily ran out of space 
to store them. As the abandoned cars be-
gan disappearing from the streets, citizen 
calls shifted to calls about drugs, especially 
crack houses. 
At first volunteers manned the hotline, but 
later an answering machine that had been 
put into use for after-hours calls was used 
for all calls. The recorded hotline greeting, 
originally very brief to conserve storage 
capacity, was expanded for more effective 
police followup. The expanded greeting 
encouraged callers to supply details needed 
about the address, date, and time of the 
incident. 
Garden police car program. A two-
officer police car was dedicated to work in 
two housing projects located in the South 
Precinct area. The officers, who were not 
responsible for responding to any but 
extreme emergency radio calls, used con-
ventional neighborhood-oriented police 
tactics, even though the layout of the 
projects did not encourage a walking beat. 
They checked on drug activity and made 
arrests when needed. Usually the same two 
officers were assigned to the car, and the 
residents grew to feel they "owned" the 
garden car. 
Gaining broader participation 
Heightened police presence and activity 
eventually led to broad community sup-
port for the SSCPC-police partnership. 
Although dominated from the start by 
members of the powerful, politically so-
phisticated, mainly white Rainier Chamber 
of Commerce, SSCPC acknowledged its 
responsibility to extend its activity and 
power to the broader community. 
Early efforts were not promising. When 
SSCPC delegated two white members to 
seek out additional black representation, 
they discovered that membership in black 
organizations and churches tended not to 
be geographically based and that few were 
located in the South Precinct (most were in 
the Central Area to the north). 
In mid-1989, however, a large middle-
class neighborhood group met at the South 
Precinct station to express its anger over a 
rash of burglaries. SSCPC sent representa-
tives, though few from the aggrieved 
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neighborhood had ever heard of SSCPC. 
At a followup meeting, an SSCPC member 
took one of the incensed protestors aside to 
compare notes, converting him instantly to 
an SSCPC activist. 
Transferring its efforts less from race to 
race than from neighborhood to neighbor-
hood, SSCPC gradually spread its um-
brella. Neighborhood leaders seeking 
empowerment and self-respect found they 
could quickly tie their own anticrime cru-
sades to the larger effort of SSCPC. 
Spreading its geographic influence gave 
SSCPC the ethnic diversity it sought. 
Police liaison broadens 
A different lack of diversity appeared in 
the original arrangement in which the 
citizen group, arguably a somewhat elite 
one, communicated mainly with precinct 
command-level police officials: the pre-
cinct captain, occasionally a lieutenant, but 
only rarely a sergeant, much less a patrol 
officer. 
The police department's Crime Prevention 
Division, staffed mainly by civilian em-
ployees rather than sworn officers, was 
responsible for such activities as Neighbor-
hood Block Watch and Business Watch. 
But the division had little rapport with the 
Rainier Chamber of Commerce and re-
ceived public criticism from the Chamber. 
Only after the Crime Prevention Division 
was reorganized in 1989 did relations 
improve. The Crime Prevention Division 
began to assign Block Watch organizers 
permanently. Before then, once Block 
Watch was established in a neighborhood, 
the organizers were reassigned to other 
neighborhoods. 
Relations between SSCPC and the Crime 
Prevention Division now became more 
positive. Even the crime prevention orga-
nizers began to stop into the South Precinct 
station more frequently . 
Involving other city agencies 
Inevitably, other public agencies were 
affected by the SSCPC-police partnership. 
The Seattle Housing Authority (SHA) had 
already developed a tough policy of evict-
ing tenants found with drugs and worked 
in close cooperation with the police. The 
second-ranking SHA official participated 
l SSCPC meetings. Although at first SHA 
did not feel participation in SSCPC needed 
to extend to the housing projects' onsite 
managers, pressure and encouragement 
from SSCPC led to SHA's advocacy of 
increased resident manager involvement in 
controlling drug-related crime and partici-
pation in community cleanup programs. 
SSCPC lobbied legislative branches and 
various agencies of the city government. 
Its purpose was twofold: to obtain more 
resources for the police and to further the 
goals it shared with the police. Particular 
efforts were directed to the strengthening 
of State antidrug legislation that the police 
had long desired. All the top commanders 
in the Seattle police joined in the lobbying, 
as did a number of city organizations. 
Pressure was similarly applied to other 
parts of the criminal justice system-to the 
prosecutor's office to urge that drug traf-
fickers be charged with the most serious 
crime legally possible-and to other city 
agencies to solve community public safety 
problems such as poor lighting in the 
parks. 
This pressure showed that successful col-
laboration between SSCPC and the police 
was taking place. The police reported the 
problems that needed to be solved, and 
SSCPC applied the pressure that brought 
about action. 
Spreading to other 
parts of the city 
SSCPC operated in only two of the three 
"sectors" of one of the city's four police 
precincts. But when quarterly crime statis-
tics indicated the South Precinct was show-
ing substantial improvement (see figure 3), 
a loosely formed group in the East Precinct 
(the Central Area and Capitol Hill) sought 
guidance from SSCPC. The group ob-
tained a grant to hire away an SSCPC 
activist to work in the East Precinct. By-
laws, loosely patterned after those of 
SSCPC, were used to establish the East 
Precinct Crime Prevention Coalition. 
Originally interested in a broad range of 
social problems such as teen pregnancy, 
housing, and substance abuse prevention, 
the East Precinct decided by the end of 
1988 to concentrate on criminal justice 
issues. Rather than complain about prob-
lems and demand police action, the group 
discovered it could play a positive role in 
controlling crime. 
The West Precinct lies mainly in the down-
town Seattle area encompassing the central 
business district. It houses a host of social 
service agencies, including release centers 
for parolees, food and shelter missions for 
street people, shelters for battered women, 
alcohol and drug treatment centers, and 
shelters for runaway or abandoned youth. 
It also has a growing number of luxury 
condominiums; two popular tourist areas, 
the Pike Place Market and Pioneer Square; 
and a nationally known sports facility, the 
Kingdome. 
Downtown has a number of small business 
groups such as the Pioneer Square Busi-
ness Association and the Pike Place Mar-
ket Association. There is also a large 
umbrella organization, the Downtown 
Seattle Association, that conducts some of 
the most effective lobbying in the city, 
typically in favor of police budgets. 
The Pioneer Square Business Association 
helped lead strong lobbying efforts for 
better control of work release probationers; 
enforcement of liquor laws, including 
prohibition of open bottles in public; and 
for foot and bicycle police patrols in 
downtown areas where young people 
congregate. 
Citywide coordination 
In spring 1989, the city and police depart-
ment brought in a management consulting 
firm to recommend improvements in pub-
lic safety. The consultants recommended 
the addition of 147 sworn and civilian 
positions to the police department as well 
as citywide expansion of the South Pre-
cinct partnership. This involved develop-
ing citizen-based advisory councils in all 
precincts to play a strong role in advising 
precinct commanders on community 
affairs. 
The city accepted the team's recommenda-
tions and incorporated them in a referen-
dum, the Public Safety Action Plan, which 
was placed before the voters in November 
1989. It gained overwhelming approval 
and furthered the joint interests of SSCPC 
and the police by strengthening not only 
the police but a number of community 
organizations that were helping in the 
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crime prevention effort. The plan had 
several provisions. 
Crime Prevention Councils. The plan 
authorized the city to allot $95,000 each 
year to increase citizen involvement in 
precinct work. This took the form of grants 
to SSCPC and other crime prevention 
councils to pay for recordkeeping, mailing 
lists, board support, and other expenses. 
Police Department Advisory Councils. 
Funds were also earmarked for the devel-
opment of citizen-based councils that 
would advise the precinct commanders on 
community issues. Precinct commanders 
would have input into the selection of 
board members as well as agenda items. 
Community-Police Teams. A key recom-
mendation of the consultants' study that 
was incorporated into the Public Safety 
Action Plan was to introduce into each 
precinct of the city a community policing 
team composed of five officers and one 
sergeant. The team would give full-time 
attention to community policing and would 
be specifically excluded from the responsi-
bility of answering 911 calls. The purpose 
of creating the specialty teams was to lock 
the concept of community policing into 
each precinct. 
The East and South Precincts actually 
implemented the team idea ahead of the 
funding package. This served to test the 
concept and identify potential problems, 
such as the perception that the teams had 
"soft" jobs and the need to develop special 
training, operating procedures, and per-
formance evaluation criteria for the offic-
ers on the teams. Close communication 
and coordination within the department, 
together with judicious selection of targets 
appropriate to the specialized team ap-
proach, were deemed important in mitigat-
ing these problems. 
Joint Parks Department and Police 
Guild Program. Funds were allocated to a 
program in which police union volunteers 
would work with older youth in an evening 
hour recreational program. The Police 
Guild had been eager to work with the 
Parks Department in developing such a 
program. 
Youth Intervention Program. The plan 
called for a program to be jointly planned 
by the police, the Department of Human 
Resources, the schools, and community 
Figure 3 
Part 1 Offenses 
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Serious crime rose throughout the city beginning in 1982 and 1983. The reverse in this trend that began in South Seattle in 1987 and in 
other parts of the city in 1988 indicates the positive effects of SSCPC's and eventually other precincts' police-citizen partnership. 
(The FBI's Part 1 offenses comprise the following serious crimes: murder, rape, robbery, burglary, aggravated assault, larceny-theft, arson, and 
motor vehicle theft.) 
agencies. The program's purpose was to 
prevent youth from getting involved in 
gangs and to intervene with youth who 
were already at high risk of involvement. 
Lessons learned about 
communities and police 
Many definitions of community policing 
exist, but they all have one element in 
common: a cooperative approach to work-
ing with citizens and other agencies based 
on the concept of shared responsibility for 
community security. 
Yet too often, the neighborhoods where 
crime is worst and poses the greatest prob-
lems for police and citizens are precisely 
the neighborhoods where police have had 
few positive contacts with residents and no 
experience of cooperation. Their relation-
ship to citizens in these areas is more likely 
to have been marked by distrust, confron-
tation, and hostility. 
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Despite this, the Seattle experience indi-
cates there is cause for optimism. Even 
when the climate is at first confrontational, 
police and citizens can still forge a positive 
working partnership. But the partnership 
must be built step by step. These are the 
stages that communities can often expect 
to go through: 
Stage 1. This is the challenging/venting 
stage, when citizens vociferously criticize 
police methods and instances of abuse of 
power or fault the police for doing "too 
~tle, too late." The police, put on the 
..1efense, can do little but explain their lack 
of resources and power. Many of their 
accusers may abandon the fray once they 
have vented their anger. 
Stage 2. At this organizational stage, 
participants agree to "play ball." Commu-
nity members start to attend meetings 
regularly, ready to work on specific issues. 
A stable relationship is developed within 
which police and community can hammer 
out a mutual agenda. 
Stage 3. Now police and community, 
having formed a stable relationship, com-
mit to action. This is the success stage. 
Actions are accomplished. Success breeds 
not only more success but also a trusting 
relationship. The group is even secure 
enough to weather turnover and changes in 
leadership. 
Stage 4. In the final long-term stability 
stage, the group can mount continuous 
efforts to resolve problems as well as re-
cruit wider community representation. 
New roles for the community 
.11 cities that have successfully imple-
mented community policing methods, 
citizens and citizen groups have fulfilled a 
variety of roles to help police enforce the 
law. In Seattle the community: 
• Supported traditional police efforts by 
helping select targets for police action. 
• Sent a message to potential lawbreakers 
that a neighborhood was off bounds, for in-
stance by painting out graffiti with police 
officers painting beside them. 
• Served as the "eyes and ears" of the po-
lice by manning a hotline for receiving 
crime information from citizens. 
• Obtained legislative help for police by 
lobbying and testifying on behalf of laws 
and ordinances that would give police 
forceful tools, especially to stop drug loi-
tering on private property. 
• Provided feedback to police on the suc-
cess of their efforts by organizing dinners 
and special events where officers and su-
pervisors were thanked for work well 
done. These special occasions provided the 
~ormal vehicle for recognizing police that 
.>frequently missing under traditional po-
licing methods. 
• Brought the need for adequate police 
services to the'attention of the State legis-
lature, the mayor, city council, and upper 
echelons of city government. While this 
activity has the potential for inducing 
neighborhoods to compete with each other 
for services, in Seattle police managers 
were able to prioritize and allocate re-
sources in a way that was fair to all groups. 
Some conclusions 
In addition to identifying the steps toward 
fruitful cooperation, one can distill several 
other lessons from the Seattle experience 
in community policing: 
Traditional policing and community 
policing must remain partners. 
Traditional police methods are not, as 
many fear, incompatible with community 
policing. Community policing is not just a 
joint problem-solving process. It can also 
involve arrest-oriented, get-tough solu-
tions. The difference is that under commu-
nity policing, the "tough" police action is 
not a surprise to the law-abiding commu-
nity. In fact, it may have been requested by 
residents and citizens working with the 
police. Seattle is having little difficulty 
blending the traditional and community-
oriented policing approach. Community-
Police Teams work in tandem with regular 
patrol to handle the full range of public 
safety problems. 
Some community policing programs 
are natural. 
A more livable neighborhood is good for 
its own sake. The argument, for example, 
that painting over graffiti and removing 
abandoned cars should reduce crime is 
intuitive to citizens in livable neighbor-
hoods. Such activities unite the community 
and send a message that residents care 
about what happens to their neighborhoods 
and are watching. It tells would-be law-
breakers that criminal activity will no 
longer pass unnoticed. But in Seattle, it is 
also clear that the removal of "bad actors" 
from the neighborhoods is what most 
encouraged the residents to act. Police 
cleaned drug trafficking out of a park and 
outlying streets. Reducing the criminal 
element meant reducing fear of crime; it 
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allowed neighborhood residents to reclaim 
their parks and streets. 
Community policing may create 
turf problems. 
Other public agencies are often surprised at 
the amount of work created for them when 
police become concerned with community 
problems; some may not be able to re-
spond as quickly as police and citizens 
would like. For instance, some agencies 
must follow a very slow and careful legal 
process in dealing with such problems as 
building code violations. A housing 
agency does not want the police to dictate 
its processes and priorities any more than 
the police want to be managed by a 
citizens league. 
A related problem arises when it is clear 
that a call by a business leader to the 
mayor's office brings a faster agency re-
sponse than one from the neighborhood 
police officer. In Seattle this politicization 
became a two-edged sword. On the one 
hand, officers were in a position to mobi-
lize some action by the community to 
produce a response by the agency. On the 
other hand, if the agency perceived that the 
police played such a role, interagency 
conflict resulted. 
Community policing, and the workload it 
implies for other agencies, suggest the 
need for municipal leadership to mandate 
some common interagency goals and chart 
a new way for agencies to operate together. 
New coordination links must 
be created by police. 
Community policing may involve con-
scripting the entire department into solving 
broader community problems, or it may 
focus on establishing specialized units, 
freed from responding to 911 calls. One of 
the problems with specialty units is that 
they become isolated from other units and 
from patrol. 
Although it is often prudent to get the 
programs going with specialized teams like 
Seattle's Community-Police Teams, or by 
initially testing the program in certain parts 
of the city, the whole department needs to 
be brought on board as local conditions 
and constraints permit. In any event, com-
munity policing will require more coordi-
nation and enhanced information sharing 
not only between police units, but ideally 
within city government as a whole. 
When implemented, community 
policing may influence citizen calls 
for service and neighborhood 
crime levels. 
Community policing tactics presume an 
understanding that not all calls for service 
require the immediate, ear-on-the-way 
response of decades past. In the Seattle 
South Precinct, however, calls for service 
have actually increased since SSCPC 
began, while declining in the rest of the 
city. Although the number of serious 
crimes declined throughout the city, the 
decline was most dramatic in the South 
Precinct areas where SSCPC was most 
active. 
Incorporating community policing 
into a department's operational 
structure may require sensitivity to 
issues of police accountability. 
Community policing holds that neighbor-
hood officers should be able to use their 
judgment in taking whatever action is 
necessary to solve a problem. These ele-
ments, however, may create concerns 
about the appearance of corruption, exces-
sive force, and "letting the officer own too 
much of his beat." 
Typically, modem policing employs rota-
tion of assignment (among other tactics) to 
prevent such abuses. Arbitrary rotation, 
however, is antithetical to the idea of com-
munity policing. Under this style of polic-
ing, an officer is encouraged to get to 
know the community, become aware of a 
neighborhood's dynamics, and develop 
open lines of communication. All of this 
takes time and would be undermined by 
the normal police rotation cycle. 
Another important aspect of community 
policing-target selection-need not cre-
ate the risk of payoffs or corruption that 
some critics might predict. In Seattle offic-
ers were dealing with an organized group 
of neighborhood citizens rather than with 
individuals in defining issues to be ad-
dressed and targets to be selected. 
Community policing duties require 
officer skills different from those 
used in traditional policing. 
Officers using community policing strate-
gies need to think independently and cre-
atively. They must be able to develop 
appropriate steps for solving problems. 
Seattle's lesson is that departments imple-
menting community policing techniques 
must modify their recruitment, selection, 
and training programs to develop a core of 
officers with the initiative and instinct for 
working with the community and with 
government agencies. A first step for po-
lice departments is to develop standards for 
recruiting, training, and evaluating staff 
assigned to community policing duties. 
A successful citizen-police partnership 
expands its goals and membership 
to include broad segments of the 
community. 
While at first the partnership may address 
only a selected group of issues that are of 
concern to a limited number of residents, 
the success of the police-community part-
nership requires an expansion of both its 
goals and participants. This is clearly the 
course taken in Seattle, where SSCPC and 
the police found that many resources they 
needed to solve their local problems rested 
with the State legislature, the city council, 
or public and private agencies. In reaching 
out to these entities and to the diverse 
elements within their own community, 
SSCPC and the police not only achieved 
their initial goals but also were able to see 
them eventually adopted citywide. 
Having identified the lessons learned in 
Seattle, NIJ' s reporting team offered 17 
community-police program recommenda-
tions and 14 recommendations for re-
search. A partial list follows. 
Program recommendations 
• Strongly consider the community polic-
ing approach in all police agencies and ju-
risdictions. This is in keeping with present 
NIJ theory and policy, which holds that in 
recent years discussion of the rhetoric of 
community policing has slowed its actual 
implementation, and that developing and 
implementing successful community polic-
ing models should take immediate priority. 
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e Establish the partnership nature of tht 
community-police relationship in the early 
stages. 
e Develop clear and reasonable goals and 
time schedules; pushing too fast involves a 
large degree of risk. 
e Secure the commitment of city and 
elected officials at an early stage. 
• Develop programs (and communica-
tions mechanisms) with other city depart-
ments and service delivery groups. 
• Begin with an evaluation plan. 
Research recommendations 
• Update and extend research on the rela-
tionship between decay, physical disorder, 
fear, and crime. 
• Study the financial impact on police 
and cities of the community-oriented 
approach. 
• Explore whether and how community-
oriented programs may displace crime 
(move it from one neighborhood to 
another). 
• Review the coordination needed be-
tween police and other departments in or-
der to enhance this process. 
Evolution of a true 
partnership 
The Seattle experience offered no new 
answers to the frequent definitional de-
mand, "What is community policing?" It 
has, however, underscored the need for 
police and citizens to share responsibility 
for community security and has empha-
sized the usefulness of target selection and 
a problem-solving focus. Usually, ad hoc 
neighborhood groups organize around 
specific problems, but interest fades when 
the problem appears solved. In Seattle, the 
community and police continued their 
partnership. 
In 1987, when the SSCPC revolution was 
growing rapidly, a new police captain took 
command in the South Precinct. He soon 
met with SSCPC and established his dedi-
cation to its principles. 
When potential investigators asked him 
about crime, he pointed out that crime in 
the South Precinct was decreasing and 
,ng confined to smaller areas. A news-
photo showed him brush in hand, in civil-
ian work clothes, at a graffiti paintout. He 
repeatedly pointed out that he was raised in 
South Seattle and still lived there. Best of 
all, he told SSCPC: 
In essence, what you are doing here is 
asking [the police] to do what I used to 
do as a young officer 20 years ago. 
You're asking us to come out to the 
neighborhoods and get to know the 
people. 
Even more than this, the Seattle experience 
can provide useful guidance and serve as a 
model for other communities that are inter-
ested in developing meaningful partner-
ships involving citizens and the police. 
Several elements in the SSCPC-police 
partnership experience in Seattle are par-
ticularly noteworthy: 
• The partnership has enabled the com-
munity and the police to work together on 
a day-to-day basis in the joint task of con-
trolling crime and increasing public secu-
rity. Together, citizens and police define 
the problems, select the targets to be ad-
~ssed, and in many cases share in devel-
t-'ing the strategies to deal with them. In 
short, the basis for the partnership is a 
sense of shared responsibility for commu-
nity security. 
• The partnership has provided benefits 
for both parties that sustain and reinforce 
the relationship between the police and 
the community. When citizens feel more 
safe and secure, and when police experi-
ence the support of citizens who lobby for 
better legislation and more resources for 
police work, the partnership is continually 
reinforced. 
• SSCPC's evolution from a committee of 
the Rainier Chamber of Commerce to a 
working partner with the police has in-
volved many discussions and decisions 
about each side's responsibilities for 
achieving common goals. At each juncture, 
decisions have been jointly taken and for-
malized. These form the foundation for a 
workable collaboration between the police 
and citizens. 
• Over time the partn rship has developed 
into an eftecliv means of increasing com-
munity security by expanding its focus to 
encompass a range of issues that affect the 
quality of neighborhood life. It has demon-
strated that crime prevention, broadly de-
lined, benefits from the joint atl'enlion of 
police and community. 
The seeds of the partnership between police 
and citizens were sown 5 years ago in the 
Rainier Valley section of Seattle. In the 
short time since then the partnership has 
spread to the entire city. The citizens of 
Seattle have endorsed the partnership's 
goal in a referendum and committed pub-
lic funds to a tronger safer community. 
The Seattle experience offe1 ::1 u eful 
model of strategies for other cities to study 
and make their own. 
Notes 
1. In Atlantic Monthly, March 1982. 
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